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WHY THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
SPARKED PERPETUAL TRUSTS
Mary Louise Fellows*
Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff, in the work they
presented at this Symposium and in their earlier work, Jurisdictional
Competitionfor Trust Funds: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Perpetuitiesand
Taxes, provide data to support what practitioners, policymakers, and
academics already believe-the generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax
exemption encouraged the creation of dynastic trusts and made those
states that had no Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) and no income tax
on trusts particularly attractive as sites for settlors to establish their
trusts.' Their work with the state-level panel data assembled from
annual reports to federal banking authorities by institutional trustees is
impressive and provides compelling evidence of the agility of estate
planners and trust departments of banks to take advantage of state laws
that lower the cost of giving. Schanzenbach and Sitkoffs study
attributes repeal of the RAP and the growth of perpetual trusts to the
GST tax exemption. Throughout their article, however, they write
about how the "GST tax sparked the movement to abolish the Rule and
the rise of the perpetual trust. ' 2 I want to talk about the components
that made up the dry tinder on which that spark fell.
The first component, a phenomenon that Schanzenbach and Sitkoff
readily acknowledge, is that property owners consistently have shown a
predilection for exercising dead hand control. 3 They argue, however,
that their "findings cast doubt on" any inference of a "dynastic impulse"
based on the recent rise of the perpetual trust, because their data show
that the increase in perpetual trusts occurred after Congress enacted the
GST tax. 4 I instead would contend that the GST tax exemption put a
"spark" to the dynastic impulse already present. Anglo-Saxon law and
culture long have embraced the idea of control of property after death
and naturalize settlors' desires for it, as the earliest wills in England
demonstrate. Before the Norman Conquest and after Beowulf saved his
*

Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota

1 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).

2 See, e.g., Max M. Shanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuitiesof Taxes? Explaining the
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2468 (2006).
3 Id. at 2478.
4 Id at 2471.
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people from the dragon, Anglo-Saxons as early as the ninth century died
with wills. 5 The earliest example is the Old English will of the Kentish
reeve Abba, which dates after 833 and before 839.6 Notably, it contains
elaborate provisions specifying which of his family members were to
receive land and who should take it after their respective deaths.
Abba's will is not an oddity. Written about 150 years later, the 4000word will (the longest of all the extant Old English wills) of the wealthy
widow fEthelgifu creates successive life estates and contingent
remainders in her extensive land holdings. For example, she provides:
And the land at Standon (is to be given) to Leofsige... for his
lifetime; and after his lifetime it is to be given to )Elfwold; and after
their lifetime, to St. Albans. And they are to sing for her and for her
lord's soul thirty masses and thirty psalters every year, and the
7
monks are always to have the use of it in common.
In a world of no taxes (if you will, estate planning in the first
millennium), donors clearly revealed a preference for control of the
disposition of their property after death. The only difference between
Abba and _Ethelgifu and their twenty-first century counterparts is that
lawyers, over the last 1000 years, have figured out how to control
property for a longer period of time through the use of trusts and
discretionary powers. 8 This suggests that tax law may encourage
5 BEOWULF AND THE FIGHT AT FINNSBURG 1-120 (Friedrich Klaeber ed., 3d ed. 1950). The
action in Beowulf takes place in the fifth and sixth centuries. See FRED C. ROBINSON, BEOWULF
AND THE APPOSITIVE STYLE 6 (1985); ANGLO-SAXON WILLS xli (Dorothy Whitelock ed. &
trans., 1930) (describing the tenth and eleventh century wills contained in this volume and
indicating the edited versions of wills that can be found elsewhere). Scholars do not agree on the
exact number of extant Anglo-Saxon wills. Michael D. C. Drout, Anglo-Saxon Wills and the
Inheritanceof Tradition in the English Benedictine Reform, 10 J. SPANISH SOC'Y FOR MEDIEVAL
ENG. LANGUAGE & LITERATURE 5, 7 n.8 (2000). Dorothy Whitelock, in Anglo-Saxon Wills, has
edited and translated thirty-nine wills belonging to the period between about the middle of the
tenth century and the Norman Conquest in 1066. ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra. Florence
Elizabeth Harmer has edited and translated two from this same period and others from an earlier
period. SELECT ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES
(Florence Elizabeth Harmer ed., 1914) [hereinafter SELECT DOCUMENTS]. In THE CRAWFORD
COLLECTION OF EARLY CHARTERS AND DOCUMENTS (1895), Arthur S. Napier and William H.
Stevenson have furnished another two from the same period. After Whitelock published AngloSaxon Wills, A. J. Robertson edited a few additional wills in ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS (2d. ed.
1956). For a list of fifty-nine of the extant Anglo-Saxon wills, see Drout, supra, at 45-47.
Michael M. Sheehan provides a useful summary of the wills, their respective dates, and from
where in England they derive in THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE CONVERSION OF
THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 21-23 (1963).
6 SELECT DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 3-5, 75-76.
7 kEthelgifu, The Will of Ethelgifu, in THE WILL OF ,ETHELGIFU: A TENTH CENTURY
ANGLO-SAXON MANUSCRIPT 6, 8 (Dorothy Whitelock ed. & trans., 1968). The quote in the text
is Dorothy Whitelock's translation of the following lines of ,,Ethelgifu's Will: and lond cet
standune leofsige ... his dweg and after his dege sylle hit man alfwolde ofor heora daeg into sce
albane and hy gesingonfhy for hire hlafordes s a wle Celce gere xxx. mwessana and xxx. saltera.
and cefre ta munecas his brucen gemenelice. Id. at 9, 11.24-28.
8 1 argue elsewhere that Nthelgifu sought both economic and spiritual goals through the
creation of life estates and that to consider her will exclusively as an economic document distorts
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dynastic trusts, but it does so within a context in which donors always
(i.e., since they began to write wills) have been all too happy to retain
control of their property after they have died. Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff s study demonstrates that our culture has normalized the idea of
control of property after death and supports the conclusion that the GST
tax exemption influences, but does not itself generate, the attractiveness
of dynastic trusts.
A second component of the dry tinder on which the GST tax
exemption landed concerns the U.S. tradition of focusing on the
donative power of donors and dismissing or ignoring their donees'
claims to be respectable property owners. Discussions favoring dead
hand control either treat the donees as invisible or they construct donees
as in need of protection. 9 As Schanzenbach and Sitkoff report, since
1986, eighteen states have joined South Dakota, Idaho, and Wisconsin
to abolish the RAP, and several other states are considering repeal
legislation.10 That level of endorsement of dead hand control could not
happen except within a tradition that devalues donees' rights to control
the property they have received.
The nineteenth-century debates
surrounding the spendthrift doctrine provide a classic example of how
U.S. law and culture promote donative power by delegitimating donees
as property owners.
The nineteenth century witnessed both the advent of the spendthrift
doctrine" and the limited liability private corporation.' 2 Both types of

its cultural import as a spiritual practice. Mary Louise Fellows, )Ethelgifu's Will As Spiritual
Practice (Oct. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with
author).
9 I am not arguing either that donees do not enjoy substantial benefits from perpetual trusts
or that they oppose the trust arrangements established by their donors. On the contrary, a
dynastic trust arrangement can protect beneficiaries from their creditors and allow them to enjoy
significant tax benefits, which could very well allow them to pursue entrepreneurial activities
more successfully. See T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuitiesand the Law Commission's
Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 287-90 (2000); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2588, 2603-08 (2003). With that said, however,
commentators generally do not describe trust beneficiaries as vibrant capitalists. For example,
Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier argue that "it isn't clear that the aggregate satisfaction of all
class members [i.e., trust beneficiaries], present and future combined, is increased by the Rule
against Perpetuities." Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1322 (2003). They say this after they ask us to consider
the likely preferences of the mentally incompetent; of minor children; of bad money
managers who lack the discipline to lash themselves to the mast; of people (maybe
those same people!) hounded by creditors and vulnerable to bankruptcy; of people,
supported by the state, who are beneficiaries of discretionary trusts, which the state
cannot touch; of people contemplating divorce and interested in having their property
out of the reach of the other half; of people who reap nice tax advantages from trusts,
including spouses who benefit from the marital deduction, and beneficiaries of taxexempt dynasty trusts, among others.
Id.
10 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 2466 (2006).
11 See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d

2514

CARDOZO LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 27:6

entities are based on a separation of investment responsibility and
ownership. Through corporate limited liability a shareholder can
engage in business without risking the financial security provided
through other investments and wealth.
Analogously, through a
spendthrift clause, a beneficiary can engage in business and place at risk
all of her or his wealth, except the beneficial interest subject to the
alienation restraint. Policymakers understood both the corporation and
the trust to be legal devices that the wealthy could use to concentrate
their wealth and power, and for that reason both were the subject of
controversy in the nineteenth century. 13
Notwithstanding their
similarities, the respective arguments made on behalf of the spendthrift
trust doctrine markedly differed from those made on behalf of limited
liability for corporations.
Whereas spendthrift trust proponents
14
emphasized the donative freedom and autonomy rights of the donor,
limited liability proponents relied heavily on the "flight-of-capital"
argument.' 5 That is to say, the argument was made that a state should
provide for corporate limited liability to stave off capital leaving the
state in pursuit of more friendly corporation laws. Competition for trust
deposits through liberal trust laws apparently played little or no role as

ed., Boston, Boston Book Co. 1895); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS UNDER THE
NEW YORK STATUTES AND ELSEWHERE-INCLUDING INSURANCE PROCEEDS (2d ed. 1947);
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1985); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547
(1964).
12 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 75-76, 291-92, n.165 (1992); E. Merrick Dodd, The
Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351
(1948).
13 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194, 252-53 (2d ed. 1985).
14 In Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), Justice Miller writing for the Supreme Court in
dictum focused on the power and ownership rights of the donor:
[T]he doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing
of it, cannot so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing
in return, must hold it subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon
deprive him of all the benefits sought to be conferred by the testator's affection or
generosity, is one which we are not prepared to announce as the doctrine of this court.
Id. at 725. He went on to emphasize the donor's power by constructing the recipient of the
donor's largesse as in need of protection.
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in
securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the
vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for selfprotection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.
Id. at 727.
Miller's singular focus on the right of a property owner to give away "his" property in a
manner that could assure that the purpose of the gift would be achieved reflects classical legal
thought. Classical lawyers understood the objective of property rules to be the fulfillment of
private intentions and dispositive freedom as a legal right. Alexander, supra note 11, at 1230-32.
For a more recent discussion of Nichols v. Eaton, see John K. Eason, Developing the Asset
ProtectionDynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 39-49 (2002).
15 Dodd, supra note 12, at 1367.
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states embraced the spendthrift trust doctrine in the late nineteenth

century.
The similarities between the arguments of opponents of the limited
liability corporation and the opponents of the spendthrift trust, however,
are striking. Opponents of limited liability argued that it would
encourage reckless management decisions and increase the likelihood of
business failures. 16 This argument parallels the one made by John
Chipman Gray that spendthrift trusts would lead beneficiaries to engage

in reckless irresponsible behavior. 17 What is interesting is that the
proponents of spendthrift trusts did not rely on corporate limited
liability to support their arguments, and opponents of the spendthrift
clause did not feel the need to distinguish the legal rule that allowed
shareholders to leave corporate creditors unpaid. The courts and

commentators apparently had difficulty seeing the relevance of
corporation law, because the limited liability enjoyed by the shareholder
for entrepreneurial purposes bore no connection to the trust beneficiary,
who advocates of the spendthrift trust doctrine frequently described at

best as vulnerable and a victim of misfortune and at worst as
intemperate and licentious.' 8

Self-determination and protectionism

16 See LESLIE HANNAH, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE ECONOMY 18 (2d ed. 1983); Dodd,
supra note 12, at 1370.
17 Gray viewed spendthrift trusts as an inappropriate extension of the separate estate rules that
included restraints on alienation for married women. GRAY, supra note 11, at 214, 258. The
interrelationship in Gray's thinking between the individual autonomy of the donee and the
disabilities of married women reflected in the separate estate trust is obvious when he states:
The common law has recognized certain classes of persons who may be kept in
pupilage, viz. infants, lunatics, married women; but it has held that sane grown men
must look out for themselves, that it is not the function of the law to join in the futile
effort to save the foolish and the vicious from the consequences of their own vice and
folly. It is wholesome doctrine, fit to produce a manly race, based on sound morality
and wise philosophy.
Id. at 243.
18 A review of the origin of the doctrine's name leaves no doubt that the term was chosen
exactly for the connotations it raises about the character of the recipient of the settlor's largesse.
The phrase "spendthrift trust" was first used in the syllabus of an 1875 Pennsylvania case,
Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464 (1875). By 1875, a line of cases in Pennsylvania had settled the
question of whether a settlor could restrain a male beneficiary from anticipating his trust interests.
The answer was clearly yes. See GRISWOLD, supra note 11, at 21-23. Ashhurst concerned a
female beneficiary, and it was on this basis that the validity of the alienation restraint was being
disputed. The court addressed the question of whether equity's provision of a trust for the
separate use of a married woman precluded the possibility of a trust that protected her from her
own debts as well as her husband's by relying on the dichotomy between the able donor and the
incapable donee when it stated:
If the beneficiary be a woman, surely the benefactor can protect her from her own
debtors and improvidence, as well as against the debts and improvidence of her
husband. That he can do this as to a man is beyond question, and no principle or policy
requires any distinction in this respect between the sexes. It is true, that girls are not so
often spendthrifts as boys, but they may sometimes be, and if extravagance in female
dress continues as it has begun, the fortunes of girls may be as rapidly dissipated in that
way, as by intemperance, gambling, and licentiousness in young men.
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coexisted within classical legal thought, and the dichotomy between

commerce and family was one of the ways classical lawyers mediated
these sometimes conflicting ideals. 19 Gray's arguments that spendthrift
clauses undermined the ideology of individual autonomy failed to
prevail2 0 because once the proponents situated the spendthrift debate

within the familial context and invoked the hierarchical arrangements
identified with family, they made it easy to subordinate the donee's
2
rights without further explanation. '
Arguably, Congress's enactment of the GST tax in 1976 and
reenactment of it in 1986 undermine the long tradition of promoting
dead hand control of donors and dismissing the self-determination
claims of donees. 22 The legislative history, however, reveals that
Congress had no concern for promoting the control of recipients over
the largesse of their donors. The GST tax exemption, which everyone
knew would result in a "substantial increase in the establishment of
generation skipping trusts... over what would occur in the absence of
any generation skipping transfer tax at all," itself proves Congress's
indifference to donees. 23 Congress could not quite bring itself to
encourage outright transfers by taxing those types of transfers at lower
rates. 24 Instead, it discouraged dynastic trusts with the GST tax, while
at the same time encouraging them through the GST tax exemption.
Further proof of the continuing strength of the tradition of donor
control emerges from the 1981 changes to the marital deduction. 25 The
Revenue Act of 1948 permitted married persons to transfer one-half of
their wealth to their partners tax free. 26 Congress designed the

Ashhurst's, 77 Pa. at 468.
19 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 1250.
20 From Gray's viewpoint, spendthrift clauses reflect a protectionism ethic and interfere with
the alienation of property in direct conflict with the nonintervention principle that prevailed
within the laissez-faire ideology as it was understood in the late nineteenth century. See GRAY,
supra note 11, at viii; Alexander, supranote 11, at 1238-40.
21 See discussion of Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), at supra note 14; Alexander, supra
note 11, at 1253-54. Concern for furthering a settlor's donative intent and disregard for the rights
of beneficiaries also influenced nineteenth-century courts when they adopted the rule that
beneficiaries could not terminate a trust prematurely if the trust continued to have a material
purpose. See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
22 The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1520, 1879-90,
contained a GST tax that Congress later repealed retroactively when it enacted another form of
GST tax in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1431-33, 100 Stat. 2085,
2717-32.
23 Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
98th Cong. 335, 338 (1984) (statement of Raymond H. Young, Chairman, Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax Subcommittee, Boston Bar Association) [hereinafter Young Testimony].
24 See id. (proposing "a tax incentive in favor of non-generation skipping transfers, namely, a
credit or rate reduction for all non-skipping transfers").
25 This discussion relies heavily on the work of Lily Kahng. See Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax,
in TAXING AMERICA 25 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
26 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 361,371-372, 62 Stat. 110, 117-121, 125-127.
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deduction to resemble community-property treatment for married
persons in common-law states making outright transfers to their
partners. 27 A transfer in trust generally did not qualify for the marital
deduction unless the donee spouse obtained control over the ultimate
disposition of the trust property through a general power of
appointment. 28 As Lily Kahng has written, Congress premised the
marital deduction on an assumption that paralleled the fiction it adopted
for income splitting. For income splitting, it relied "on the fiction that
husbands and wives shared their incomes. ' 29 For the marital deduction,
it relied on the fiction that "husband and wives wanted to share, and
actually did share, their wealth. '30 As Lily Kahng further writes,
[t]he assumption underlying the marital deduction was mistaken in a
crucial respect: husbands did not want to share their wealth with their
wives. They wanted to retain control over their wealth through dower
transfers [those in which the spouse received only an income interest
for life], but dower transfers did not qualify for the marital
31
deduction.
What cannot be denied, however, is that whatever the flaws were
in the design of the marital deduction in the view of practitioners, their
clients, and many policymakers, the federal law "strengthened married
women's property rights by providing a tax incentive for husbands to
transfer wealth to their wives. ' 32 This is one example in which the tax
law focused on the donee and created incentives to increase a donee's
power to control the ultimate disposition of property received from a
donor.
The recognition and respect for donees proved temporary. In
1948, Surrey wrote about marital unity and argued that the law should
only tax transfers when the property leaves the marital unit.33 In 1950,
he went on to describe donee wives as unworthy of ultimate control of
their husband's property.
27
28
29
30

See S. REP. No. 80-103, at 27-28 (1948).
I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e) (2000).
Kahng, supra note 25, at 33.
Id.

31 1d.

32 Id.at 35. Stanley S. Surrey, who was the Tax Legislative Counsel for the Treasury
Department during the time of the 1948 enactments, expressed the views that many had at the
time when he wrote:
[T]he splitting of estates and gifts simply rode in unheralded and uninspected on the
coattails of splitting of income.... The impact upon estate planning, upon the
disposition of property within the family, is immediate and startling. Yet on passage of
the Act, only a relative handful of attorneys close to the theater of operations even
approached awareness of what these provisions involve, and it will be many months or
even years before operative understanding of all of their ramifications is achieved by
tax practitioners.
Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1117 (1948).
33 id.at 1162.
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Basically the sorry mess we now face resulted from the illicit
alliance in 1948 of transfer tax reduction and community property
concepts.... The husband has to choose between tax savings
through releasing his hand from the control of the property on his
wife's death and the risk that when she dies some alien hand will be
34

guiding her actions.
Donor spouses finally were able to enjoy tax savings and retain
control when the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 made a mere
income interest for life in a donee spouse deductible (i.e., a qualified
terminable interest in property (QTIP)). 3 5 Although the legislative
history justifies the change by referring to the married couple as the
appropriate taxpaying unit, 36 as Lily Kahng writes, the "fiction of
marital unity.., camouflages the true purpose of the QTIP rules. The
QTIP rules eliminated the antidower incentive inadvertently created by
the 1948 marital deduction, which enabled husbands to reap the benefit
of the marital deduction while retaining dead hand control of their
wealth. '37 It may have taken over thirty years, but eventually the strong
tradition for dead hand control prevailed. The history of the marital
deduction under the transfer tax law makes clear that no one should
infer that Congress intended to restrain dead hand control through the
GST tax enacted five years earlier than the QTIP and reenacted five
years later than the QTIP.
Up to now, I have suggested that the GST tax was a spark that fell
on the historical traditions of dead hand control and of disregard for the
claims of donees to control property they receive from their donors, and
together they renewed interest in perpetual trusts. I believe two other
phenomena were also in play in the late eighties and continue to
influence the heightened interest in perpetual trusts today. One of those
phenomena concerns the RAP itself. I think it is fair to say that, when
Congress enacted the GST tax in 1986, it did not contemplate
widespread repeal of the RAP. It probably underestimated, as most of
us did, the implications of the 1986 promulgation and subsequent
widespread enactment of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (USRAP). USRAP, with its ninety-year waiting period,
crystallized the perpetuities rule. 38 No longer was it a complex rule that
34 Stanley S. Surrey, An Introduction to Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 38
CAL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1950).
35 Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301-05 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7),
2523(f).
36 S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 29 (1981); H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 52 (1981); 1981-2 C.B. 352,
412; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 233 (Comm. Print 1981).

37 Kahng, supra note 25, at 37.
38 UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8B U.L.A. 223 (2001).

Gregory

Alexander and I are currently co-writing an article about the codification of common law
concepts in which we consider the unintended consequences of uniform laws in the wills and
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only the most sophisticated lawyers really understood and could apply
with ease. Now it was a user-friendly rule that did not involve the

telling of outlandish tales of either fertile octogenarians or precocious
toddlers having children. 39 Although the statute in fact is more complex
than a quick read might suggest, because section 1 of the Act provides
that the ninety-year waiting period only applies to those dispositions for
which the common law RAP is not met, the codification nevertheless
creates the appearance that all you have to do under USRAP is count
ninety years and see whether all the interests had either vested or failed.

Once USRAP embraced a ninety-year period, policymakers could begin
to digest the possibility that, if you could wait ninety years, you could
wait 190 years or 380 years or forever. USRAP itself became a part of
the dry tinder on which the GST tax fell to spark perpetual trusts.

Simplification and codification of the RAP made repeal widely and
easily imaginable.
The last component of dry tinder that has contributed to the
increase in perpetual trusts is that estate planning has taken on many
aspects of commerce. 40 The current debates in the states concerning
perpetuities repeal and the related issue of asset protection trusts
replicate the nineteenth-century arguments put forward by proponents
of limited liability corporations.
"Flight-of-capital" arguments
dominate the discussion and the distinction between the hearth (family
41
matters) and the marketplace (business transactions) has broken down.
The RAP has stood as a recognition that donees are property owners.
That idea is vanishing as it is overtaken by "flight-of-capital" arguments

trusts area.
39 See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 992
(1965) (precocious toddler); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638,
643 (1938) (fertile octogenarian); see also Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities:Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1027 (predicting that "[a]t the end
of 90 years" attorneys will not be willing to determine whether the common law RAP validates
the interest and that they "will rise (almost in unison, with only the dissent of some antiquarians)
and formally abolish the Rule at that point in time.").
40 Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities,or the RAP Has No FriendsAn Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 651-52 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
Clearly, estate planning has become an industry. This has come about for several
reasons, including the pressure on lawyers in firms to produce more income, the
inclusion in the estate planning process of business people as well as learned
professionals, and the increase in the stakes caused by the passing of enormous sums
from the Depression Generation to the Baby Boomer Generation.
Id.
41 See Robert T. Danforth, The Role of Federalism in Administering a National System of
Taxation, 57 TAX LAW. 625, 633 (2004); Stewart E. Sterk, JurisdictionalCompetition to Abolish
the Rule Against Perpetuities:R.LP. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2097-98 (2003);
Dobris, supra note 40, at 605-06; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 9, at 1315-16; Charles D. Fox
IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287,
324 (2002); Verner F. Chaffin, Georgia'sProposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much
Control, 35 GA. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
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put forward primarily by local bankers and lawyers. 42 When Raymond
Young, then the chairman for the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Subcommittee for the Boston Bar Association, warned Congress in
1984 that the exemption approach would "result in a substantial
increase in the establishment of generation skipping trusts," he also
warned it that "bank trust departments, financial planners, lawyers and
others will be aggressively marketing and advising establishment of
million dollar generation skipping trusts. '43 He appreciated then that
estate planning had taken on many of the trappings of the marketplace.
As prescient as Young was, however, not even he appreciated that the
business of estate planning would include efforts to persuade state
legislatures to repeal the RAP. 44
Dead hand control, dismissiveness of donees' rights to control
property, USRAP, and the commercialization of estate planning all
worked together with the GST tax exemption to increase the interest in
45
perpetual trusts that Schanzenbach and Sitkoff have documented.
Like Schanzenbach and Sitkoff's article, my commentary on perpetual
trusts is backward looking and leaves unanswered the question of
whether the appetite for perpetual trusts will continue into the
foreseeable future and beyond. If, as the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation has proposed, Congress amends the law to eliminate the
generation-skipping tax advantages of perpetual trusts 46 or if Congress
permanently repeals the estate tax and the GST tax, Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff s thesis suggests that the growth in perpetual trusts may
subside. 47 With interest in perpetual trusts having been sparked,
however, one wonders whether the stakeholders in the business of estate
planning will continue to find reasons to promote the continuation of
existing trusts and create more of them. At the end of their article,

42 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 2477 n.49 (discussing the role of
transactional lawyers in law reform efforts).
43 Young Testimony, supra note 23, at 338.
44 Id. at 336 (referring to dynastic trusts lasting only as long as the RAP permits).
45 Joel C. Dobris has suggested yet some other components of the dry tinder that support the
increased interest in perpetual trusts. For example, Dobris describes the emergence of many
perpetual arrangements, such as nonprofit foundations and pension trusts, in which we "accept
big pools of capital existing for indefinite periods of time as benign, at worst, and beneficent, at
best" and the good feelings the culture generally feels toward the wealthy. Dobris, supra note 40,
at 610, 614-18. His various explanations for the decline of the RAP in recent years tend to have a
broader economic and cultural sweep than the components of dry tinder I have set forth in this
commentary. Taken together with the four phenomena I have outlined, his analysis strengthens
my argument that the GST tax spark fell on a good deal of dry tinder.
46 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392-95 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
47 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§
501, 901, 115 Stat. 38, 69, 150 (2001) (repealing the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes
after December 31, 2009 and reinstating those taxes after December 31, 2010).

2006]

GENERA TION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX

2521

Schanzenbach and Sitkoff appear to raise an alarm about perpetual
trusts. They indicate that liberal rules of trust modification and
termination, along with trust provisions allowing each generation of
beneficiaries to decide to continue the trust or bring it to an end through
the exercise of non-general powers of appointment, are necessary to
control the potential problems that perpetual trusts create. 48 Whether
these tools will prove sufficiently robust to address anticipated and
unanticipated problems remains uncertain. In any case, the need for
estate planners to rely on these anti-perpetuity mechanisms suggests that
even the most ardent supporters of perpetuity trusts actually may have
far more moderate goals than assuring that donors can control the
disposition of their property and avoid taxation of it for centuries upon
centuries. If that is true, it may be more accurate for us to view the
recent quest for perpetuity trusts as nothing more than quixotic.

48 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 2497 n. I11.

